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INTRODUCTION
The high rate of HIV infection among Americans, the ease with
which the virus is transmitted, and the terminal nature of the virus
have made its existence a vital national public health issue.' Concern
regarding HIV is heightened in U.S. correctional facilities, in which
the prevalence of the virus is disproportionately high.2 As of Decem-
ber 31, 2003, 1.9% of the total U.S. prison population was known to
3
be HIV positive. Furthermore, "[a]t yearend 2003 the rate of con-
firmed AIDS in State and Federal prisons was more than 3 times
higher than in the total U.S. population. 4
Public reaction to those afflicted with HIV is often negative and
isolating due to the high-risk activities that can contribute to the
transmission of the virus. Because of the social stigmatization associ-
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SeeCenters for Disease Control and Prevention, Cases of HIV Infection and AIDS in the United
States, 2004, 16 HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT 1, 5 (2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
hiv/ topics/surveillance/resources/reports/2004report/pdf/2004SurveillanceReport.pdf (re-
porting that "at the end of 2004, an estimated 462,792 persons in the 35 areas [of the United
States surveyed] were diagnosed and living with HIV/AIDS").
2 See Ronald L. Braithwaite & Kimberly R.J. Arriola, Male Prisoners and H1V Prevention: A Call
for Action Ignored, 93 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 759, 760 (2003) ("The lifestyles of many inmates prior
to incarceration include unprotected sexual intercourse, drug and alcohol abuse, poverty,
homelessness, undereducation, and unemployment-all of which are associated with risk of
HIV/AIDS."); Scott Burris, Prisons, Law and Public Health: The Case for a Coordinated Response to
Epidemic Disease Behind Bars, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 291, 297 (1992) (noting that those who are at
higher risk for HIV and AIDS are also more likely to be incarcerated).
3 See Lauran M. Maruschak, HIV in Prisons, 2003, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN,
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, Wash., D.C.), Sept. 2005, at 1, 3 (reporting that 2% of the state
prison population and 1.1% of the federal prison population were HIV positive).
4 Id. at 5 ("About 51 in every 10,000 prison inmates had confirmed AIDS, compared to 15
in 10,000 persons in the U.S. general population.").
See Stacey D. Blayer, But Names Will Never Hurt Me: HIV Surveillance & Mandatory Reporting,
39 B.C. L. REV. 1175, 1200 (1998) ("Because HIV-positive individuals are often stereotyped as
drug users or homosexuals, revealing HIV status potentially exposes an individual to stigmatiza-
tion, discrimination and intolerance.").
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ated with HIV, privacy is of utmost importance for those infected.
6
Privacy is necessarily infringed upon in correctional facilities more so
than in the outside population. Ironically, however, prisoners covet
their privacy more than most people because of the consequences of
revealing sensitive personal information in the prison setting.7 Medi-
cal information, one of the most personal aspects of an individual's
life, is particularly private, and the unnecessary disclosure of such in-
formation can lead to avoidable, and often devastating, repercus-
sions. Because of the tendency of prison officials to make HIV status
known among officials and prisoners alike, and due to the measures
subsequently undertaken to prevent the spread of the virus, " [t] here
is little question but that the prisoner identified as having AIDS will
be severely compromised in his ability to maintain whatever dignity
and individuality a prison environment allows. ''8  Adherence to the
constitutional right to privacy is particularly important with regard to
HIV, and incarcerated individuals, for whom stigmatization associ-
ated with the disease is enhanced due to confinement, have been un-
justly denied their due privilege to privacy.9
This Comment focuses on the constitutional right to privacy and
its application to medical information, in particular, HV disclosure
in the prison setting. Part I addresses the Supreme Court's recogni-
tion of a constitutional right to privacy and its implications for medi-
cal information. Part II reviews the general rights of prisoners and
how the right to privacy in medical information applies to prisoners
in particular. Part III then discusses the methods and policies cur-
rently used in correctional facilities to address the issue of HV and
how those measures serve the penological interests of the institutions
while infringing on the privacy interests of prisoners. The doctrine of
qualified immunity will also be examined, as applied to cases in which
the confidentiality of HIV status has been breached. Part IV con-
cludes by reviewing possible alternate measures that could be taken
by correctional institutions to protect their interests in maintaining
6 See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1513-14 (11th Cir. 1991) ("In the court's view there
are few matters of a more personal nature, and there are few decisions over which a person
could have a greater desire to exercise control, than the manner in which he reveals that diag-
nosis to others. An individual's decision to tell family members as well as the general commu-
nity... is clearly an emotional and sensitive one fraught with serious implications for that indi-
vidual." (quoting Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F.Supp. 1234, 1237-38 (N.D.N.Y. 1988))).
See id. at 1514 ("Within the confines of the prison the infected prisoner is likely to suffer
from harassment and psychological pressures." (quoting Coughlin, 697 F.Supp. at 1237-38)).
8 Id. (quoting Coughlin, 697 F.Supp. at 1237-38).
9 See Kathleen Knepper, Responsibility of Correctional Officials in Responding to the Incidence of the
HIV Virus in Jails and Prisons, 21 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 45, 46 (1995)
("There may be no situs in which these concerns have greater significance than in our country's
jails and prisons. The incidence of the virus is more prevalent in these institutions than it is in
the population as a whole." (footnote omitted)).
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security and reducing HIV transmission, while also preserving prison-
ers' rightful privacy in their HIV status.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Although there is not an explicit right to privacy enumerated in
the Constitution, the Supreme Court has repeatedly touched upon
the idea of an implied right to personal privacy. Concluding that the
government should not infringe upon a couple's choice to use con-
traceptives, the Court, in Griswold v. Connecticut, held that the right to
privacy from governmental intrusion was implicit in the First
Amendment.'0 Taking the right to privacy a step further, the Court
made a monumental decision in Whalen v. Roe, stating that the Four-
teenth Amendment protects several "zone[s] of privacy.'" The ap-
pellees in Whalen claimed that one of those zones was "the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters," and the Court
agreed.'2 Whalen involved a group of New York citizens who argued
that the State's mandatory filing system, which documented the
names of individuals using controlled substances, infringed upon
those individuals' privacy rights because the public disclosure stigma-
tized those who used the drugs. 3 In recognizing a right to privacy,
the Court acknowledged the importance of personal dignity and the
need for confidentiality in personal information. 4  However, the
Court also determined that the right was not considered absolute and
therefore could be compromised for reasonable state interests.15 The
Court found that the patients' drug use information was disclosed as
"an essential part of modern medical practice" and, even though the
disclosure may have reflected "unfavorably on the character of the
patient," it was not an unconstitutional infringement by the State
upon the patients' privacy.'6
1o See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) ("[T]he First Amendment has a pe-
numbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.").
IWhalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977); see also id. at 598-99 (discussing the types of
cases that protect privacy).
12 Id. at 599.
1 Id. at 595 ("Appellees offered evidence tending to prove that persons in need of treat-
ment... will from time to time decline such treatment because of their fear that the misuse of
the computerized data will cause them to be stigmatized as 'drug addicts.'").
14 See SHIRLEY M. HUFSTEDLER, THE DIRECTIONS AND MISDIRECTIONS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF PRIVACY 15-16 (1971) ("It is an interest [in securing an individual's autonomy] that
society shares, because a society cannot long endure that is unable to preserve to its members
the autonomy of their personalities.").
15 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602 (explaining that because the State is responsible for the health
and welfare of its citizens, disclosure of health information is necessary).
1 Id. ("Requiring such disclosures to representatives of the State having responsibility for
the health of the community, does not automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of
privacy.").
Sept. 2007]
JOURNAL OF CONSTFITFTIONAL LA W
In Whalen, the Supreme Court recognized that a constitutional
right to personal privacy exists, but that the scope of the privacy pro-
tection depends on factors such as the necessity of the disclosure for
health and public policy considerations and the harm that would re-
sult if the information is disclosed.1 7 The Whalen ruling has led to
debate among the circuit courts regarding the extent of the personal
right to privacy and whether protection of privacy in medical infor-
mation and treatment is warranted. 8  Those courts which have not
extended such a right to medical information have concluded that
governmental interests supersede any individual interest in maintain-
ing privacy in medical information and that such a right to privacy
would be burdensome to government activities.19 For example, in es-
tablishing that an inmate did not have a constitutional right to pri-
vacy in his HIV status, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned
that "recognition of a constitutional right of nondisclosure would
force courts to 'balanc [e] almost every act of government, both state
and federal, against its intrusion on a concept so vague, undefinable,
and all-encompassing as individual privacy."'
In contrast, those courts which have found a definitive right to an
individual's privacy in medical information have been able to balance
that right with governmental interests to ensure that one's privacy is
not unnecessarily infringed. 2' The court in United States v. Westing-
house Electric Corp.22 established factors to consider when determining
whether an individual's right to privacy has been unreasonably in-
fringed upon by the government. "The Westinghouse balancing test
is the most appropriate test for determining whether an invasion into
an individual's records is justified because the factors enumerated in
Westinghouse are comprehensive and concretely encompass the rea-
17 Id. at 602-06.
18 See Alison M. Jean, Personal Health and Medical Information: The Need for More Stringent Con-
stitutional Privacy Protection, 37 SuFFOLK U. L. REv. 1151, 1153 (2004) ("[T]he Whalen Court did
not clarify many facets of the confidentiality branch's right to privacy. As a result, circuit court
decisions inconsistently handle situations posing confidentiality issues." (footnote omitted)).
19 See e.g.,J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1091 (6th Cir. 1981) ("[N]ot all rights of privacy or
interests in nondisclosure of private information are of constitutional dimension, so as to re-
quire balancing government action against individual privacy.").
Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994) (alteration in original) (quoting De-
Santi, 653 F.2d at 1089-90).
21 See Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that one's health is a
personal issue that an individual would want to keep confidential); United States v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (concluding that a right to privacy in an
individual's health can be maintained "within the 'private enclave where he may lead a private
life'" (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dis-
senting))).
2 638 F.2d at 570.
23 See Blayer, supra note 5, at 1192-93 ("Recognizing that information concerning one's
body has a special character, the court reasoned that medical records which may contain inti-
mate facts of a personal nature fall within a zone of privacy entitled to protection.").
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soning of Whalen.,2 4 This balancing test has been adopted by many
subsequent court rulings. Included in the factors that the Westing-
house court deemed important in weighing governmental interests
with an individual's interests were
the type of record requested, the information it does or might contain,
the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, the
injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was gener-
ated, the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the
degree of need for access, and whether there is an express statutory
mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest
militating toward access.
These factors reflect a desire by the Westinghouse court to uphold
an individual's privacy in medical information whenever it is not det-
rimental to the public interest, especially if disclosure would be inju-
rious to the individual. However, in applying this and other balanc-
ing tests, courts have been inconsistent in determining the weight to
be given to the governmental interests.27 The diverse and relatively
ambiguous standards applied by courts have generally allowed the
government excessive deference in infringing upon individuals' pri-
vacy interests. 2 Virtually any kind of public policy interest claimed by
the government has been accepted by courts as a valid reason for dis-
closing private information. 9
Despite the judicial history of allowing infringement of individu-
als' privacy, there are many benefits to preserving an individual's
24 Id. at 1202.
25 See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 25 F.3d 237, 244 (5th
Cir. 1994) (citing "subsequent public disclosure" as a factor to consider in the balancing test);
Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Ashcroft, No. C 03-4872 PJH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3383, at *5-*6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2004) (finding that, although the right to privacy in informa-
tion is not absolute, where the government seeks to compel records of risky abortions, "a bal-
ancing of the relevant considerations supports nondisclosure"); Patients of Dr. Solomon v. Bd.
of Physician Quality Assurance, 85 F.Supp. 2d 545, 547 (D. Md. 1999) (using the Westinghouse
factors to weigh whether the public interest in an investigation of a physician outweighed indi-
vidual patients' interests in the privacy of their medical records).
26 Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 578.
27 See e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987) (describing "legitimate penological objec-
tives" that must be weighed against individual prisoner's privacy); Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309,
333 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying a "compelling" government interest standard); Dunn v. White, 880
F.2d 1188, 1196 (10th Cir. 1989) (weighing the government's "substantial interest" against an
individual's right to privacy).
28 SeeJean, supra note 18, at 1153-54 ("Inconsistencies have a particularly grave effect on an
individual's right to privacy in her medical records .... Courts in differentjurisdictions use var-
ied standards of review to determine whether the privacy interest outweighs the need for gov-
ernmental intrusion. Moreover, the results of the various balancing tests seemingly favor gov-
ernmental interests in every instance at the expense of individual privacy rights.") (footnotes
omitted).
2 See Delie, 257 F.3d at 317 ("Courts must respect the administrative concerns underlying a
prison regulation, without requiring proof that the regulation is the least restrictive means of
addressing those concerns.").
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right to privacy.3° Specifically with regard to medical information, an
individual's knowledge and assurance that his personal information
will remain confidential can encourage him to seek health care
treatment when he otherwise would not)' Additionally, individuals
may be more apt to divulge important information to their providers
if they know that this information will remain confidential. By en-
couraging communication, privacy in medical information can result
in an overall improvement in treatment and may also help to prevent
the spread of infectious diseases, such as HIV, through earlier detec-
tion.
While there are certain circumstances in which medical informa-
tion must be disclosed for health or safety reasons, information re-
garding an individual's HIV status is information for which privacy is
especially important and should be protected with the utmost care.
"An individual revealing that she is HIV seropositive potentially ex-
poses herself not to understanding or compassion but to discrimina-
tion and intolerance, further necessitating the extension of the right
to confidentiality over such information. 33  The sensitive nature of
HIV and the public's frequently disapproving perception of those
with the virus necessitates that the constitutional right to privacy in
that medical information be strictly protected.34
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS
The Supreme Court has repeatedly distinguished the constitu-
tional rights of the general population from the lesser rights of incar-
cerated individuals. In reviewing the scope of a prisoner's constitu-
tional rights, the Court has held that "there must be mutual
accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the
30 See Harold Edgar & Hazel Sandomire, Medical Privacy Issues in the Age of AIDS: Legislative
Options, 16 AM.J.L. & MED. 155, 160 (1990) ("Medical privacy.., is valued for itself and is val-
ued for the protection of other interests its waiver may implicate.").
31 See Pamela Sankar et al., Patient Perspectives on Medical Confidentiality, 18 J. GEN. INTERNAL
MED. 659, 666 (2003) (reporting that HIV testing research studies show that "patients will delay
or forego treatment, or alter stories about symptoms and onset of illness, to be sure those de-
tails never emerge publicly").
32 See John Balint, Issues of Privacy and Confidentiality in the New Genetics, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 27, 32 (1998) ("The trust earned between the patient and physician as a result of the
knowledge that private personal information will indeed be kept private is essential to effective
patient-physician communication.").
.13 Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994).
See Delie, 257 F.3d at 317 ("It is beyond question that information about one's HIV-positive
status is information of the most personal kind and that an individual has an interest in protect-
ing against the dissemination of such information.").
35 See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) ("Lawful incarceration brings about the
necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system.").
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provisions of the Constitution that are of general application." 36 In
particular, the Court has specified that maintaining security and pre-
serving order and discipline are essential objectives which warrant a
limitation on prisoners' rights.3 7 Accordingly, by ruling that prisoners
have more limited rights than the general population, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly afforded great deference to prison officials and
correctional facilities in their determination of what constitutes a le-
gitimate reason for infringing upon a prisoner's supposed constitu-
tional rights. "This deference does not mean, however, that courts
must abstain from reviewing the constitutional claims of prisoners.-"
Whether inmates maintain the constitutional right to medical privacy
and how this potential right is affected by courts' deference to prison
officials is an issue that remains unresolved.4 °
To determine when a prison regulation justifiably infringes on
prisoners' rights, the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley developed a
four-prong test that resembles a government-favored version of the
factors considered in Westinghouse to determine whether an individ-
ual's privacy interest trumps government concerns. 4' The Turner
standard of review "applies to all circumstances in which the needs of
prison administration implicate constitutional rights." 4' First, there
must be a "valid, rational connection" between the challenged regula-
tion and the government interest offered as a justification for it. 3 If
there is indeed a valid connection between the regulation and the in-
terest, the Court then determines whether there are alternate means
of allowing the prisoner to exercise the right that is being infringed.44
Further, the Court considers whether a "ripple effect" would occur by
allowing the prisoner to exercise his right, meaning that if accommo-
dating the prisoner's right would have a significantly detrimental ef-
fect on other inmates and prison staff, the Court should be particu-
36 Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
37 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979) ("The fact of confinement as well as the le-
gitimate goals and policies of the penal institution limits these retained constitutional rights.").
See Knepper, supra note 9, at 93 (" [R]egardless of the type of policies which are adopted
by corrections institutions, these policies are rarely rejected by the courts that are asked to con-
sider them, even though the policies are arguably inconsistent with the penological needs of the
institution."). But see Wolff 418 U.S. at 555-56 ("But though his rights may be diminished by
the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of
constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn
between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.").
39 Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420, 1423 (11 th Cir. 1987).
40 See Stacey L. Bogert, The D.C. Circuit Review August 1998-July 1999: Recent Decisions, 68
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 643, 645 (2000) ("Because of the presumption that prisoners surrender
some constitutional rights pursuant to their incarceration, the question remains whether in-
mates possess a constitutional right to medical confidentiality.").
41 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987).
42 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990).
43 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
44 Id. at 90.
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larly deferential to the prison official's discretion.45 Finally, the Court
has ruled that the regulation should not constitute an "exaggerated
response" to prison concerns, and if there is an alternative way to
achieve the same end goals that does not impinge on a prisoner's
rights, this method should be undertaken.46
"[T] he Turner v. Safley decision established a deferential reason-
ableness standard as the level of scrutiny to be applied when a prison
regulation infringes an inmate's constitutional interests. Although
similar ... to ordinary rational basis review, the Turner standard re-
quires a more searching, four-part inquiry., 47  Beard v. Banks estab-
lished that this standard of reasonableness does not mean that a
prison policy that is simply logically related to a legitimate goal will
pass the Turner test; rather, "Turner requires prison authorities to
show more than a formalistic logical connection between a regulation
and a penological objective. 4  However, this has not made the
Turner test easy to overcome, especially considering the significant
deference that courts give to prison officials.46  The fourth prong is
particularly difficult for prisoner plaintiffs to surmount as "prison of-
ficials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable
alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional
complaint, 50 but, rather, the prisoner has the burden of providing an
alternative "that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de mini-
mis cost to valid penological interests .... .,,5 As the Court pointed
out in Overton v. Bazzetta, "[t]he burden ... is not on the State to
prove the validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to dis-
prove it.52 Because of the extreme deference given to prison officials
and the heavy burden on claimants to provide only alternatives that
are "easy, obvious, and of 'de minimis cost to valid penological inter-
ests,"' it is difficult to satisfy the "exaggerated response" requirement
for overturning allegedly unfair prison regulations. 5
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 950 (11 th Cir. 2001).
48 Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2582 (2006).
49 SeeJohnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 529 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Well before
Turner, this Court recognized that experienced prison administrators, and not judges, are in the
best position to supervise the daily operations of prisons across the country.").
50 'Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91.
51 Id. at 91.
5 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003).
53 Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at
90-91); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 247, 248 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(finding that a "rule that allows prison administrators to address potential security risks by forc-
ing psychotropic drugs on mentally ill inmates for prolonged periods is unquestionably an 'ex-
aggerated response' to that concern [I," which the Court nevertheless upheld even though the
inmate claimant presented alternatives that "would add no new costs.. . "); Thornburgh v. Ab-
bott, 490 U.S. 401, 419 (1989) (concluding that "the administrative inconvenience of [a pro-
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III. PRISONERS AND HIV
In the interest of protecting against physical abuse and discrimi-
nation within the prison population due to fear and ignorance, HIV-
positive prisoners' privacy rights must be maintained. Despite the
importance of privacy regarding one's HIV status, many correctional
facilities have adopted policies that unnecessarily abolish inmates'
privacy in this information. "Fear of the disease and of those who are
infected with it has led to the promotion of simplistic solutions to its
spread, such as placing those who are infected in quarantine or label-
ing them with tatoos [sic] or stamps. " 55 Common measures meant to
reduce the transmission of HIV, improve medical care for HIV-
positive inmates, or reduce prison violence include mandatory HIV
testing upon incarceration and subsequent placement into segre-
gated housing apart from the general prison population. Both of
these measures serve to destroy HIV-positive inmates' privacy in their
H1V status without providing evident benefits for them or their fellow
prisoners. 5 Furthermore, these policies arguably fail the fourth
prong of the Turner test, as surely they are "exaggerated" responses to
the HIV plight for which there are alternatives that do not infringe
on prisoners' privacy.- 7 Even more devastating for HIV-positive pris-
oners, the lack of concern for inmates' medical privacy has led to the
casual disclosure of inmates' HIV status by prison officials and other
inmates without any penological justification. 8
A. Mandatory HIV Testing
Many states impose mandatory testing of all incoming inmates to
determine their HIV status. Unlike the general population, prisoners
are afforded no confidentiality regarding the results of the manda-
tory tests, and the testing necessarily infringes upon prisoners' medi-
cal privacy by disclosing their HIV status to whoever is administering
the test. Whether it be through segregating the HIV-positive inmates
posed alternative to a prison policy] is also a factor to be considered" in holding that the policy
is not an "exaggerated response").
54 See Edgar & Sandomire, supra note 30, at 221 (noting the importance of respecting HIV-
positive prisoners' privacy to prevent abuse from non-affected and uneducated prisoners).
5 Knepper, supra note 9, at 51.
56 See H1V Transmission Among Male Inmates in a State Prison System-Georgia, 1992-2005, 55
MMWR 421, 421-6 (2006) [hereinafter CDC], available at http://www.cdc.gov/MMWR/
preview/mmwrhtml/mm5515al.htm ("No data are available on the effectiveness of separate
housing for HIV-infected inmates as an HIV prevention strategy."); see also Dunn v. White, 880
F.2d 1188, 1195-96 (10th Cir. 1989) (recognizing the futility of using testing and segregation as
a means of reducing HIV transmission, especially since "[tihe United States government has
stated that everyday contact does not create a risk of infection").
57 Turner, 482 U.S. at 80.
58 Edgar & Sandomire, supra note 30, at 221.
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after determining the results of the test or by simply informing prison
officials and other inmates of the test results, government officials
administering the tests often blatantly violate prisoners' rights to pri-
vacy of medical information.
The violation of prisoners' privacy through HIV testing entails
more than a simple violation of rights. "[S]creening of prisoners
raises issues concerning inmate confidentiality and safety; inmates
known to be infected may be targeted for harassment or violence by
other inmates or corrections staff.' 0 The consequence of revealing
HIV status due to mandatory testing is not simply that a prisoner's
privacy rights may be infringed, but, more detrimentally, the pris-
oner's life may be affected by having such information exposed to the
prison environment. 61 "[T]he privacy interest in one's exposure to
the AIDS virus is even greater than one's privacy interest in ordinary
medical records because of the stigma that attaches with the disease.
The potential for harm in the event of a nonconsensual disclosure is
substantial .... ,,6 As justification for mandatory testing, prison offi-
cials put forth several arguments, all of which are legitimate goals that
can be better served through alternative means. One argument is
that learning an inmate's HIV status through mandatory testing is es-
sential to provide the most appropriate medical care. However, if
the prisoner's H1V status is known confidentially by only the pris-
oner's healthcare provider, he still can receive appropriate medical
care without having his HIV status needlessly exposed. Another ex-
planation for mandatory testing is that it is needed in order to prop-
erly segregate those who are HIV positive from the rest of the prison
population, as a way of protecting the HIV-positive inmates from
physical abuse by other inmates because of the stigma attached to the
virus. 64 On the other hand, without the mandatory testing and sub-
sequent segregation, the rest of the prison population would not
know of an inmate's HIV status and, therefore, no physical abuse
See id. at 220 (" [S] tatutes requiring testing of prisoners are often vague as to the limits on
disclosure of the results and what use can be made of them.").
60 Mary E. Clark, AIDSPrevention: Legislative Options, 16 AM.J.L. & MED. 107, 147 (1990).
61 See CORR. SERV. OF CAN., HIV/AIDS IN PRISONs: FINAL REPORT OF THE EXPERT COMMITTEE
ON AIDS AND PRISONS 26 (1994) ("[Blenefits from such [mandatory] testing are very limited
and questionable, while harms include breach of a person's right to inviolability, self-
determination, autonomy, privacy and confidentiality, and the risk of discriminatory and other
harmful treatment.").
62 Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 384 (D.N.J. 1990).
63 See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("By examining inmates as
they enter the facility, providers can identify those patients who need uninterrupted medica-
tion .... Providers can also prevent from being admitted to the prison's general population
those who pose a threat to the health and safety of others (such as inmates with communicable
diseases).").
CA See Knepper, supra note 9, at 53 (concluding that correctional institutions sometimes jus-
tify their policies of mandatory testing and segregation based on the idea that HIV-positive pris-
oners are protected from violence by other inmates through segregation).
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could arise from it. 5 Mandatory testing may be promoted as a means
of protecting prison officials and guards from the danger of contract-
ing HIV. However, this is also unconvincing, because regardless of a
prisoner's HIV status, prison employees should use universal precau-
tionary measures when dealing with all prisoners. Finally, prison offi-
cials may espouse mandatory testing as a method of curbing the
transmission of HIV within the prison. Yet, "[c]ontrary to the public
perception that AIDS must be spreading like wildfire in prisons, the
disease actually appears to be spreading more slowly in the nation's
prison population than in the general population."'67 Despite the lack
of concrete evidence that mandatory HIV testing for incoming pris-
oners effectively serves valid correctional interests-the first hurdle
for passing the Turner test-courts maintain that testing does not un-
fairly infringe upon prisoners' right to privacy in their medical in-
formation.6g
B. Segregation of HIV-Positive Inmates
U.S. correctional facilities continue to maintain segregated hous-
ing for HIV-positive inmates, despite the lack of conclusive evidence
showing its effectiveness in reducing the transmission of HIV.69 Fur-
thermore, the National Commission on Correctional Health Care
specifically disapproves of segregation, finding that it "will lead
quickly to stigmatization..... Although there have been many in-
mate challenges to the constitutionality of HIV-positive inmate segre-
65 See Edgar & Sandomire, supra note 30, at 221 ("In prison, protection of private informa-
tion yields protection from assaults by other prisoners.").
66 See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding that "the lack of any in-
dication in the record that AIDS is communicable among prisoners who do nothing but live
together does not diminish the prison's interest in testing"); Christopher P. Krebs & Melanie
Simmons, Intraprison HIV Transmission: An Assessment of Whether It Occurs, How It Occurs, and Who
Is at Risk, 14 AIDS EDUC. & PREVENTION 53, 53 (Supp. B 2002) (noting that "data validly docu-
menting instances of intraprison HIV transmission are rare").
67
Martha A. Field, Testing for AIDS: Uses and Abuses, 16 AM.J. L. & MED. 33, 83-84 (1990)
(remarking on the spread of HIV, before prisons began implementing HIV segregation).
M See Paramo v. Matthew, No. 92-3144, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 26256, at *5 (10th Cir. Oct. 10,
1992) ("When the custodial authority establishes a valid penological reason for a standard HIV
screening for all incoming prisoners, as in this case, no individual has an expectation of privacy
that can transcend the need to administer the test.").
See CDC, supra note 56, at 425 ("[S]eparate housing of HIV-infected inmates is limited in
that it 1) does not reduce the spread of other sexually transmitted, opportunistic, and blood-
borne infections, 2) might increase the risk for tuberculosis outbreaks .... 3) raises concerns
about disclosure of inmates' HIV status and access to prison programs, and 4) does not prevent
transmission by inmates who are unaware that they are infected or by HIV-infected corrections
staff.").
70 NCCHC Clinical Guideline for Health Care in Correctional Settings: HIV Infections, CLINICAL
GUIDELINES (Nat'l Comm'n on Corr. Health Care, Chi., Ill.), Oct. 2006, at 7.
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gation, they have been largely unsuccessful.7 ' In Harris v. Thigpen, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that segregation was a le-
gitimate way to reduce HIV transmission, even though there was no
evidentiary proof that it was effective, and that the disclosure of pris-
oners' HIV status was simply an inherent by-product of the necessary• 72
segregation. To buttress the weak foundation upon which the gov-
ernment's argument stood, the court noted that there was an inter-
vening class of inmate defendants who opposed the release of the
HIV-positive inmates into the general prison population and that the
existence of these defendants indicated that there would be a signifi-
cant risk of violence if the segregation were ended. 73  This opinion
concluded that although segregation was not necessarily an effective
means of reducing HIV transmission, it was acceptable to infringe on
HIV-positive prisoners' right to privacy in this way because the gov-
ernment's intentions were good and the potentially violent recourse
by other prisoners resulting from desegregation might be difficult to
handle.74
In reviewing the four-step Turner test, the court acknowledged
that the appellants had presented an alternative approach to the
problem that "implies that [the current segregation] is perhaps a
more extreme approach .... .. However, the court dismissed the
idea that this "extreme approach" was an "exaggerated" response by
pointing out that the Turner test is "not a least restrictive means
,,76test .... In this way, more reasonable and potentially efficient ways
of satisfying the goal of reduced HIV transmission are being ignored
because of courts' deference to existing prison policies.
In Camarillo v. McCarthy, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held an inmate segregation policy by simply stating that it had not
71 See Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638, 640 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that segregation
fulfills "legitimate penological interest[s]" and therefore may impinge on an inmate's constitu-
tional rights); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1519 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that although
segregation is a "more extreme approach" to reducing the transmission of HIV, it passes the
Turner test and therefore is constitutional); Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9, 10 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (finding that separating HIV-positive inmates from the rest of the population "bears a
rational relation" to reducing HIV transmission).
72 See Harris, 941 F.2d at 1517 (admitting that "[e]ven if Alabama's approach in this case is
now a minority position among state correctional systems, we simply are unable to say at this
point that the DOC's use of combined mass screening and segregation is so remotely connected
to the legitimate goals of reducing HIV transmission and violence .. ").
73 See id. at 1518 (noting that the "ripple effects" of eliminating the segregation could be
great because of the concern of the general prison population over the proposed integration).
74 See id. at 1519 ("The Supreme Court has emphasized that the consideration of other al-
ternatives to assess a current prison policy or restriction's reasonableness is not a least restrictive
means test: 'prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alter-
native method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint."' (quoting Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1987))).
75 Han-is, 941 F.2d at 1519.
76 Id.
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been clearly established "that a prison policy segregating HIV-positive
inmates from the general prison population is unconstitutional.",
77
The court, in this case, applied the doctrine of qualified immunity
and held that since there was no precedent affirmatively establishing
that segregation was unconstitutional, segregation could be consid-
ered a permissible institutional act.
7 8
By contrast, the district court in Doe v. Coughlin found that segre-
gation of HIV-positive prisoners for the purpose of improving medi-
cal care was both unconstitutional and unnecessary. The court held
that forced housing segregation was severely detrimental to individ-
ual prisoners, remarking that "[t]here is little question but that the
prisoner identified as having AIDS will be severely compromised in
his ability to maintain whatever dignity and individuality a prison en-
vironment allows." 79 Applying the Turner test, the court found that
although improved medical care for inmates with AIDS is a "desir-
able" and "highly commendable" objective, this objective was "served
in a constitutionally impermissible manner."80 The court concluded
that the noble goal of improving medical care "could be provided
equally well, with no more than de minimis costs to the program's ob-
jectives, in a program designed to allow the prisoner to choose
whether he wishes to be housed in [the segregated dormitory]." ''
With this holding, Coughlin stands for the idea that if there are alter-
nate methods to promote the goals of a correctional institution,
which do not violate prisoners' constitutional rights, the institution
has a duty to seek out those alternative measures instead of maintain-
ing unconstitutional "exaggerated responses."
C. Casual Disclosure of HIV Status and Qualified Immunity
More distressing than the disclosure of HIV status as a by-product
of mandatory testing and segregation is the casual disclosure that
sometimes occurs without apparent purpose. Unfortunately, suits
brought by inmates against prison officials due to casual and unwar-
ranted disclosures of HIV status have been largely unsuccessful.
Unlike other medical information, "[t]he sensitive nature of medical
information about AIDS makes a compelling argument for keeping
this information confidential .... The potential for harm in the
77 Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 1993).
78 Id. at 640 n.3. ("Our research convinces us that the right Camarillo asserts was not clearly
established inJune 1987.").
79 Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
so Id. at 1240.
81 Id. at 1243. The Coughlin court rejected the unconstitutional policy, although it acknowl-
edged "the oft-stated admonition concerning the limited role courts should take when the ad-
ministration of prisons is at issue." Id. at 1241.
Sept. 2007] 1289
JOURNAL OF CONSTFI'UTIONAL LAW
event of a nonconsensual disclosure is substantial ....,,s' Therefore,
courts have held HLV status to a higher standard of privacy than other
medical concerns."' However, in reviewing the disclosure of HIV
status, courts generally evaluate the conduct of prison officials under
the doctrine of qualified immunity, which provides a shield from per-
sonal liability for government officials for certain actions done within
the scope of their employment.8 4 There are three factors to consider
in the application of qualified immunity: (1) whether the right has
been defined with "reasonable specificity"; (2) whether applicable
case law supports the existence of the right; and (3) whether the offi-
cial under review would have reasonably understood that his acts
were unlawful under preexisting law.
5
Correctional officers have successfully applied the doctrine of
qualified immunity to defend their disclosure of inmates' HIV status,
even when the disclosure was unnecessary (for example, through
simple gossip) s6 and even in cases in which the courts explicitly rec-
ognize the right of the inmate to privacy in his medical information .
7
The doctrine of qualified immunity is meant "to alleviate frivolous
lawsuits and allow the [government] official to complete her work
without needless interference." 8 However, in the medical informa-
tion context, this doctrine has instead relieved prison officials of li-
ability when they infringe on prisoners' privacy because of the great
deference that courts afford prison officials and due to the difficulty
82 Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 384 (D.N.J. 1990); see also Doe v. Delie,
257 F.3d 309, 323 (3d Cir. 2001) (condoning prison officials' casual disclosure of an inmate's
HIV status among themselves as protected under qualified immunity even though "the Four-
teenth Amendment protects an inmate's right to medical privacy"); Anderson v. Romero, 72
F.3d 518, 520 (7th Cir. 1995) (affording qualified immunity to prison guard who told another
inmate that Anderson was "a homosexual and a faggot" and that the other inmate could "catch
AIDS from him").
See Franklin v. McCaughtry, 110 F. App'x. 715, 719 (7th Cir. 2004) (comparing "fairly pe-
destrian maladies" that do not need protection from public dissemination with "intensely pri-
vate medical information," like H1V-positive status, which requires a higher level of privacy).
2 AM.JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 586 (2006).
85 Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 1999).
86 Id. at 112.
87 Compare Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1184 n.5 (10th Cir. 2000) (Seymour, J., dis-
senting) ("It is true that where a constitutional deprivation is determined by balancing oppos-
ing factors, this mitigates against a finding of clearly established law .... However, we have
stated on numerous occasions that qualified immunity is nevertheless abrogated if it was 'suffi-
ciently clear that Defendants should have known the [governmental] interests would not survive
a balancing inquiry.'" (quoting Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 1992) (altera-
tion in original))), with Maia R. Albrecht, Comment, Defining Qualified Immunity: When Is the
Law "Clearly Established?,"40 WASHBURN L.J. 311, 332 (2001) ("[T]he court must.., be mindful
of not defining the right in such a narrow manner so as to insulate the government official from
liability inherent in not upholding the laws they are charged with abiding.").
88 Albrecht, supra note 87, at 318; see also supra Part II (describing prisoners' privacy rights).
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that prisoners have in overcoming the "exaggerated response" hurdle
of the Turner test.8'
The tendency of courts to defer to prison officials' discretion in
their actions, and to refrain from penalizing officials when their ac-
tions are clearly unjust, is illustrated in Powell v. Schriver.9° In Powell,
the court weighed the correctional facility's penological interests
against the prisoner's interest in maintaining confidentiality and
found that "the gratuitous disclosure of an inmate's confidential
medical information as humor or gossip-the apparent circumstance
of the disclosure in this case-is not reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest ...." ,9' However, the court then deemed the of-
ficial who disclosed the information to be protected from punish-
ment under the doctrine of qualified immunity because "the right of
a prisoner to maintain the privacy of medical information was not
clearly established" when the disclosure occurred. 92  Although in
some circuits the right to privacy has now been "clearly established,"
it remains to be seen whether courts will continue to protect officials'
disclosures of important medical information through qualified im-
munity.
Fortunately, some courts have recognized that, in employing the
Turner test, a regulation that infringes on inmates' rights cannot be
justifiably sustained, even through applying qualified immunity.
They reason that officials employing the regulation should be held
responsible for infringing on inmates' rights if the logical connection
between the right and the penological goal is so remote as to render
the policy arbitrary and irrational.' 3  In Nolley v. County of Erie, the
court found that putting red stickers on the medical charts of HIV-
positive inmates did not rationally further the goal of protecting in-
mates from the spread of HIV; therefore, the court rejected this gov-
ernmental "interest" and held that the inmates' rights were being un-
justly infringed. 4 Similarly, in Woods v. White, the court found that
because an inmate's HIV status was disclosed in a conversation that
did not serve any significant public interest, there was no reason to
undergo a balancing review of the government's interest and the in-
89 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987); see also id. at 332 ("The defense of qualified im-
munity, while intended to encourage efficient operation of the government, is not a defense
that is without limits; otherwise, there would be no distinction between absolute immunity and
qualified immunity.").
90 See Powell, 175 F.3d at 112 (commenting on the ease with which courts can come up with
"circumstances under which disclosure of an inmate's HIV-positive status would further legiti-
mate penological interests.").
91 Id.
92 Id. at 113.
93 See Albrecht, supra note 87, at 320 ("Often, the result of examining an official's claim to
qualified immunity is that a balancing test is necessary to weigh the rights of the individual
against the needs of the government which the official was charged to fulfill.").
94 802 F. Supp. 898, 901-02 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
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mate's right and instead simply found in favor of the inmate. 95 By
employing the Turner test to examine whether the government had a
truly legitimate concern and whether the methods undertaken by the
government had a valid relation to the ultimate goal, these courts
successfully upheld inmates' privacy rights when they were being un-
fairly violated.
IV. ALTERNATIVE HIV PREVENTION MEASURES
Alternative measures, such as voluntary HIV testing and increased
HIV education for inmates and staff, can reduce the transmission of
HIV in the prison population just as effectively as the approaches cur-
rently used in U.S. prisons that deny prisoners their medical privacy
rights. With available alternatives promising to be as effective as
more infringing approaches and more suitable to the prison setting,
correctional facilities should refrain from employing privacy-
infringing policies that arguably constitute an "exaggerated response"
under the Turner test.96 However, since "many prison officials are
slow to embrace HIV prevention messages (e.g., the consistent use of
condoms, the use of sterile syringes) that they perceive as directly
contradicting policies that prohibit anal sex, condom use, and injec-
tion drug use in prisons,"9 the judicial system must play a role in fa-
cilitating the development of new policies by employing a more "bal-
anced" test for weighing correctional facility interests against
prisoners' privacy rights, as addressed above.
A. Voluntary HIV Testing
The World Health Organization (WHO) has developed universal
guidelines for correctional facilities on how to deal with prisoners
with HIV and how to contain the transmission of HIV within prison
walls.99 The guidelines emphatically reject the use of mandatory test-
95 689 F. Supp. 874, 876-77 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
See RalfJfirgens, Developments in Criminal Law and CriminalJustice: Sentenced to Prison, Sen-
tenced to Death? HJV and AIDS in Prisons, 5 CRIM. L.F. 763, 786 (1994) ("[P] rovision of bleach
and sterile needles, and often even of condoms, is strongly opposed. Acknowledging that drug
use and sex are a reality in prisons would, in the eyes of many, be to acknowledge that prison
authorities have failed; similarly, providing bleach, sterile needles, and condoms would mean
condoning prohibited behavior in prisons. Given the devastating consequences of HIV infec-
tion, the problematic aspects of making bleach, sterile needles, and condoms available in pris-
ons, when both drug use and sexual activity are prohibited, should be tolerated.").
97 Braithwaite & Arriola, supra note 2, at 761.
98 UNAIDS, WHO GUIDELINES ON HIV INFECTION AND AIDS IN PRISONS 4 (1999), available at
http://data.unaids.org/Publications/IRC-pubI/JC277-WHO-Guidel-Prisons-en.pdf (provid-
ing standards "which prison authorities should strive to achieve in their efforts to prevent HIV
transmission in prisons and to provide care to those affected by H1V/AIDS").
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ing as unethical and ineffective. 0 Elimination of mandatory HIV test-
ing and implementation of a voluntary testing program in which in-
mates would have a choice about whether to be informed of their
HIV status would both promote their right to privacy and also main-
tain the goal of providing medical care to those who need it.' 00
"Through voluntary testing, an inmate may become aware of his own
seropositive status and may seek aptropriate medical care or request
segregation for his own protection."
Eliminating mandatory testing would necessarily affect the ability
of correctional facilities to maintain and enforce segregated HIV-
positive inmate housing. However, "[a] utomatic isolation of persons
with HIV infection is neither necessary nor appropriate as a means of
preventing the spread of HIV infection within facilities." 10 2  There-
fore, the only true purpose segregation would seem to serve is to pro-
vide optimal health care for HIV-positive prisoners. This legitimate
goal can just as easily be achieved through voluntary HIV testing at an
arguably "de minimis" cost. With confidential and voluntary testing,
inmates could get the health care they need without being subjected
to the consequences of having their HIV status known by other pris-
oners and prison officials.
B. Universal Precautions and Education
Like the WHO, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
recommends that prisons use "universal precautions and education"
to reduce HIV transmission rather than mandatory testing and segre-
gation. 0 3 However, as documented above, many American prisons do• 104
not follow this suggestion. The Canadian federal penitentiary sys-
99 See id. at 7. In addition, the WHO suggests that "[i]nformation regarding HIV status may
only be disclosed to prison managers if the health personnel consider, with due regard to medi-
cal ethics, that this is warranted to ensure the safety and well-being of prisoners and staff, apply-
ing to disclosure the same principles as those generally applied in the community." Id.
1oo See Anne S. De Groot et al., Setting the Standard for Care: HIV Risk Exposures and Clinical
Manifestations of H1V in Incarcerated Massachusetts Women, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 353, 363 (1998) (recommending voluntary and confidential HIV testing of in-
mates as a means toward identifying and treating individuals with the disease).
101 Knepper, supra note 9, at 94.
102 Clark, supra note 60, at 147; see also Krebs & Simmons, supra note 66, at 56 ("Of the studies
that definitively document cases of intraprison HIV transmission, few actual cases are identified
and little is known about those inmates or how they contracted HIV.").
103 Knepper, supra note 9, at 45; see also De Groot et al., supra note 100, at 356 ("Through H1V
education and prevention strategy sessions provided by health care and social support staff,
high risk HIV seronegative women may learn to reduce their risk of HIV infection while H1V
seropositive women may learn self-care skills to improve their clinical prognosis and harm re-
duction strategies to reduce the risk of HIV transmission to their partners.").
104 Elizabeth Kantor, HJV Transmission and Prevention in Prisons, HIV INSITE KNOWLEDGE BASE
CHAPTER, Apr. 2006, http://hivinsite.ucsf.edu/nSite?page=kb-07-04-13 ("In 2003, 19 state
prison systems and the Federal Bureau of Prisons had mandatory HIV screening policies for
their incoming inmates.").
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tem, by contrast, has developed a universal precaution strategy of
measures to prevent exposure and transmission of HIV, regardless of
whether an inmate is known to be infected or not, thereby eliminat-
ing the need for mandatory testing and segregation of HIV-positive
inmates. Canada also prohibits disclosure of HIV status to prison of-
ficials and inmates, unless it proves to be the only means possible to
avoid harm that cannot otherwise be prevented.
One of the most effective ways in which correctional facilities can
promote the reduced transmission of HIV and also continue to pro-
vide optimal care for HIV-positive inmates is through educating
healthcare staff, prison officials and guards, and even the prisoners
themselves about the HIV virus. 105 "Education regarding the nature
of the HIV virus and the means of its transmission should be required
for all corrections officials and inmates, regardless of the policies
which are adopted by the institution. As many of the problems as-
sociated with disclosure of prisoners' HIV status stem from the prison
staffs reaction to news of the disease, education of all individuals in-
volved in the prison system would encourage a more accepting envi-
ronment for HIV-positive inmates and a safer atmosphere for every-
one. 0 7  Education of inmates would also promote a safer prison
atmosphere: "The anticipated violent reaction by some general
population prisoners to integration is likely predicated on fear, some
of it irrational and magnified by misinformation; such fear might or
might not be allayed with more education about the disease than is
already being provided. '08 By creating awareness of the virus, and
hopefully thereby reducing virus-related violence, the threat of vio-
lence will no longer be a legitimate reason for maintaining segre-
gated housing. Likewise, by implementing universal precautionary
measures and educating all staff about the virus and the precaution-
ary measures to use, mandatory testing of inmates to determine their
HIV status will no longer be a legitimate method to control the
spread of the virus under the Turner test, as the universal precautions
would prove to be a preferable alternative measure at a de minimis
cost.
105 See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1519 (lth Cir. 1991) ("The importance of AIDS
education in both prisons and the population at large is immense, and, for that matter, not dis-
puted.").
106 Knepper, supra note 9, at 95.
107 HIV education offered in prison can also promote continued HIV management for HIV-
infected prisoners who are released back into the community. See Kantor, supra note 104 ("Pris-
oners represent a crucial and huge target population for HIV education programs; prisons con-
centrate persons at risk who are not easily reached in the community by such efforts.").
108 Harris, 941 F.2d at 1520.
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C. Condoms and Sterile Needles
The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)
cites drug use through shared, non-sterile equipment as the greatest
factor in the transmission of HIV in prison, with unprotected sex be-
ing a close second.'l '0 Accordingly, in order to curb transmission,
UNAIDS suggests that correctional facilities implement needle ex-
change programs offering sterilized needles and provide access to
free condoms."° Although "[p]roviding condoms to sexually active
persons is an integral part of HIV prevention interventions,"" most
prisons do not allow for free condom distribution because doing so
would promote sexual activity in prison, which constitutes a crime in
most prison settings." 2
Providing free sterile needles to prisoners raises the same con-
cerns as providing condoms. However, free-needle programs in
Europe and Iran have led to documented declines in HIV transmis-
sion between prisoners. 1 3 Tattooing and body piercing are other vi-
rus-spreading activities that take place behind bars, which can be ren-
dered safe by dispersing clean needles."
4
CONCLUSION
Although an individual's right to personal medical privacy is not
explicitly enumerated in the Constitution, "[a]n individual's medical
records should fall within the array of materials entitled to privacy
protection because information about one's body and state of health
is a matter which the individual is ordinarily allowed to retain pri-
vately."" 5 Privacy relating to an individual's HIV status in particular
should be a closely coveted right due to the negative impact that dis-
closure of HIV-positive status can have on an individual and the peo-
109 UNAIDS, UNAIDS BEST PRACTICE COLLECTION: PRISONS AND AIDS 2 (1997), available at
http://data.unaids.org/Publications/IRC-pubO5/Prisons-PoV-en.pdf.
110 Id.
I CDC, supra note 56, at 423.
112 SeeJiirgens, supra note 96, at 768 ("Studies undertaken in the United States suggest that
10-30 percent of inmates engage in homosexual activity, but many prison systems, including
the vast majority of U.S. systems, still oppose making condoms available to inmates."); Kantor,
supra note 104 (noting that sexual activity within prison walls is often a "punishable crime").
113 SeeJoseph Hall, A Breeding Ground for Communicable Disease, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 16, 2006,
at A06 ("Free-needle programs offered inside jails by a handftl of liberal European countries-
as well as in some repressive states like Iran-have led to huge declines in HIV transmission be-
tween prisoners .... In Switzerland, a long-standing prison needle program has virtually elimi-
nated transmission of HIV and hepatitis injails.").
114 Kantor, supra note 104 ("Tattooing is a widespread activity in prisons and usually is per-
formed without fresh or sterile instruments."). Kantor notes that body piercing would benefit
from clean instruments as well. Id.
115 Blayer, supra note 5, at 1200.
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pie around him. 116  Although "prisoners' constitutional rights are
necessarily subject to substantial restrictions and limitations in order
for correctional officials to achieve legitimate correctional goals and
maintain institutional security,""117 courts must act as regulators of the
purported correctional goals to ensure that prisoners' rights are not
being unnecessarily infringed, and they should apply the Turner test
accordingly. Like the general population, prisoners have an interest
in keeping their HIV status private, an interest that should be valued
and protected to the greatest extent possible. To enable prisoners to
uphold their dignity, correctional facilities should prevent the un-
necessary disclosure of HIV status through transmission reduction
and health promotion tactics that respect individuals' privacy. At the
same time, courts should no longer defer to correctional officials' au-
thority when the officials are using their authority to unnecessarily
and unfairly violate prisoners' rights through "exaggerated re-
sponses.
Finally, in order to "reduc[e] the transmission of HIV in the
United States, comprehensive and credible programs of interactive
education, counseling, testing, partner notification, and practical
risk-reduction techniques (e.g., safer sex and safer drug injection)
should be implemented for adult inmates in prisons and jails and for
juveniles in confinement facilities."18  In addition, to both reduce
HIV transmission through education and alleviate the stigma associ-
ated with HIV, mandatory training and education programs should
be implemented nationally for correctional facility staff.19 By em-
ploying such techniques, the government can achieve its penological
goals while at the same time preserving prisoners' personal rights,
thereby reducing the need for court interference in the operation of
correctional facilities.
16 See Albrecht, supra note 87, at 316 ("Perhaps nowhere is the task of balancing the individ-
ual's need for privacy as opposed to the government's need for information and status report-
ing more evident than in the area of HIV and AIDS. When an individual's HIV status is invol-
untarily communicated, the repercussions are often enormous.").
117 Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1514 (11th Cir. 1991).
[i HIV/AIDS Education and Prevention Programs for Adults in Prisons and Jails and Juveniles in
Confinement Facilities-United States, 1994, 45 MMWR 268, 270 (1996), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00040737.htm.
19 See Braithwaite & Arriola, supra note 2, at 762 ("There is thus an apparent need for in-
creased staff training and education designed to modify attitudes about HIV among correc-
tional personnel. Such in-service training should be required of all correctional staff and ad-
ministrators as a certification for employment.").
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